top of page
Injury/Accident

Surreptitious Recording -Vicarious Consent


Surreptitious Recording - Call the Law Offices of Cory H. Morris, 631-450-2515 (NYS) (954) 998-2918 (FLA)

Defendant was charged with four counts of assault in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and one count of endangering the welfare of a child. A recording was made by the father of the child, “which was played to the jury at defendant’s trial, defendant told the five-year-old boy that he was going to hit him 14 times for lying and that this would hurt more than a previous beating.” The defendant contested to the use of the recording and that ” the recording amounted to eavesdropping in violation of Penal Law § 250.05, because no party to the conversation consented to the recording, so that the evidence was inadmissible under CPLR 4506…”The trial court allowed the recording to be admitted into evidence, with respect to the endangering the welfare of a child count, holding that the father’s action was not eavesdropping, and that, even if it were, it was justifiable on the basis of the “duty of the father to take some action once he heard [defendant’s] conduct.” The court relied on People v Clark (19 Misc 3d 6 (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008), lv denied 10 NY3d 861 [2008]), in which the Appellate Term permitted the admission of a recording based on a theory of vicarious consent.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment (124 AD3d 672 (2d Dept 2015))… [adopting] the vicarious consent doctrine, as recognized with respect to the federal wiretap statute by the Sixth Circuit in Pollock v Pollock (154 F3d 601 [6th Cir 1998]), and in New York by the Appellate Term in People v Clark.In New York, “[t]he contents of any overheard or recorded communication, conversation or discussion, or evidence derived therefrom, which has been obtained by conduct constituting the crime of eavesdropping, as defined by section 250.05 of the penal law, may not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or proceeding before any court or grand jury” (CPLR 4506 [1]). The Court finds that father’s actions on his cellphone did not constitute “wiretapping” because, with respect to the telephonic communication he recorded, he was “a sender or receiver thereof.” Penal Law § 250.00 (1).

“Defendant argues, however, that the father’s actions amounted to the crime of “‘ mechanical overhearing of a conversation’ ” (Penal Law §§ 250.05, 250.00 [2]), and that the recording was consequently inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals holds that “the definition of consent, in the context of “mechanical overhearing of a conversation” pursuant to Penal Law § 250.00 (2), includes vicarious consent, on behalf of a minor child.”:The principle of vicarious consent that we adopt originates in federal case law. The federal wiretapping law, like the New York statutes we interpret here, contains an exception for the interception of a communication with the consent of one party. “It shall not be unlawful under this chapter . . . for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State” (18 USC § 2511 [2] [d] [emphasis added]).The facts certainly seem to help draw this decision.

A contrary decision would mean that the father of the child (no doubt trying to protect the child) would be helpless to address the harm being done by the defendant. The Court further states that “the vicarious consent doctrine recognizes the long-established principle that the law protects the right of a parent or guardian to take actions he or she considers to be in his or her child’s best interests. Yet it also recognizes important constraints on that right, by requiring that the parent or guardian believe in good faith that it is necessary for the best interests of the child to make the recording, and that this belief be objectively reasonable.” The Court further warns that:Our holding should not be interpreted as a vehicle to attempt to avoid criminal liability for the crime of eavesdropping when a parent acts in bad faith and lacks an objectively reasonable belief that a recording is necessary in order to serve the best interests of his or her minor child. Penal Law § 250.05 and CPLR 4506 cannot be so easily circumvented. To be sure, the procedural vehicles of pretrial hearings in CPLR 4506 and CPL 710.70 must be used to determine the admissibility of any recordings and will result in the suppression of any parent’s recording that a court determines did not meet our narrowly tailored and objective test. In making this admissibility determination, a court should consider the relevant factors already discussed, which include, but are not limited to, the parent’s motive or purpose for making the recording, the necessity of the recording to serve the child’s best interests, and the child’s age, maturity, and ability to formulate well-reasoned judgments of his or her own regarding best interests.The judgment is affirmed.

The case is People v Badalamenti, 2016 NY Slip Op 02556 (April 5, 2016).

Call the Law Offices of Cory H. Morris, 631-450-2515 (NYS) (954) 998-2918 (FLA)


Featured Posts
Recent Posts
Archive
Search By Tags
No tags yet.
Follow Us
  • Facebook Basic Square
  • Twitter Basic Square
  • Google+ Basic Square
bottom of page